Introduction
Radiation protection standards apply to radiation workers or the general population. Standards for the general population are of importance since they serve as a basis for many of the considerations applicable to the siting of nuclear facilities and the design and implementation of environmental surveillance programs. Included in this section are a brief history of the development of radiation protection standards, a review of the goals and objectives sought, and a description of the approach being used to base such standards on the associated risk.

History of the Basis for Dose Limits
Shortly after the discovery of x-rays of 1895 and of naturally occurring radioactive materials in 1896, reports of radiation injuries began to appear in the published literature (i). Recognizing the need for protection, dose limits were informally recommended with the primary initial concern being to avoid direct physical symptoms. As early as1902, however, it was suggested that radiation exposures might result in delayed effects, such as the development of cancer. This was subsequently confirmed for external sources and, between 1925 and 1930, it became apparent for internally deposited radionuclides when bone cancers were reported among radium dial painters (1). 

With the publication by H.J. Muller in 1955 (ii) of the results of his experiments with Drosophila, concern began to be expressed regarding the possibility of genetic effects of radiation exposures in humans. This concern grew and dominated the basis for radiation protection from the end of World War II until about 1960, and led to the first consideration of recommendations for dose limits to the public. With the observances of excess leukemia among the survivors of World War II atomic bombings in Japan, and the failure to observe the previously anticipated genetic effects, however, the radiation protection community gradually shifted to a position in which somatic effects, primarily leukemia, were judged to be the critical (or governing) effects of radiation exposures. This belief continued until about 1970 when it was concluded that, although somatic effects were the dominating effects, the most important such effects were solid tumors (such as cancer of the lung, breast, bone, and thyroid) rather than leukemia (iii). Finally, in 1977 the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) initiated action to base radiation protection standards on an acceptable level of the associated risk (iv). This effort was provided additional support by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) with the issuance of their updated "Recommendations on Limits for Exposure to Ionizing Radiation" in 1987 (v).

Basic Standards - Philosophy and Objectives 
The primary source of recommendations for radiation protection standards within the United States is the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP). Recommendations of this group are in general agreement and many of them have been given legislative authority through publication of the Code of Federal Regulationsvi by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

1. Basic Philosophy-As a general approach, the main purposes in the control of radiation exposures are to ensure that no exposure is unjustified in relation to its benefits or those of any available alternative; that any necessary exposures are kept as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA); that the doses received do not exceed certain specified limits; and that allowance is made for future developments.
2. Objectives of the Guides-In general, the objective or goal of radiation protection (and associated standards) is to limit the probability of radiation-induced diseases in exposed persons (somatic effects) and in their progeny (genetic effects) to a degree that is reasonable and acceptable in relation to the benefits of the activities that involve such exposures.

Radiation-induced diseases of concern in radiation protection are classified into two general categories: stochastic effects and non-stochastic effects.

• A stochastic effect is defined as one in which the probability of occurrence increases with increasing absorbed dose, but the severity in the affected individuals does not depend on the magnitude of the absorbed dose. A stochastic effect is an all-or-none response as far as individuals are concerned. Cancers (solid malignant tumors and leukemia) and genetic effects are examples of stochastic effects.

• A non-stochastic effect is defined as a somatic effect which increases in severity with increasing absorbed dose in the affected individuals, owing to damage to increasing numbers of cells and tissues. Examples of non-stochastic effects attributable to radiation exposure are lens opacification, blood changes, and decreases in sperm production in the male. Since there is a threshold dose for the production of non-stochastic effects, limits can be set so that these effects can be avoided.

Radiation Protection Standards:

• Occupational Dose Limits

Standards provide for an upper boundary effective dose equivalent limit of 50 mSv/year (5 rem/year). On a cumulative basis, however, the newest NCRP recommendations have proposed that the average cumulative effective occupational dose equivalent not exceed 10 mSv (1 rem) times the age of the worker. UC Davis guidelines limit exposure to roughly one-half the state and federal limits. Two key changes or factors to be noted relative to these recommendations are:

• The dose limit applies to the sum of the doses received from both external and internal exposures.
• The standards are expressed in terms of the effective dose equivalent, an approach which permits, on a mathematical basis, the summation of partial and whole body exposures.

Dose Limits for the General Population 
For a variety of reasons, dose limits for the general population are set lower than those for radiation workers. Justifications for this approach include the following:

1. The population includes children who might represent a group of increased risk and who may be exposed for their whole lifetime.
2. It was not the decision or choice of the public that they be exposed.
3. The population is exposed for their entire lifetime; workers are exposed only during their working lifetime and presumably only while on the job.
4. The population in question may receive no direct benefit from the exposure.
5. The population is already being exposed to risks in their own occupations; radiation workers are already being exposed to radiation in their jobs.
6. The population is not subject to the selection, supervision, and monitoring afforded radiation workers.
7. Even when individual exposures are sufficiently low so that the risk to the individual is acceptably small, the sum of these risks (as represented by the total burden arising from somatic and genetic doses) in any population under consideration may justify the effort required to achieve further limitations on exposures.

Concept of Effective Dose Equivalent (4,5)

A.  Basic Objectives: 
The objective in developing the concept of the effective dose equivalent was to obtain a system that would provide a unit for radiation protection standards that could be used to express, on an equal risk basis, both whole body and partial body exposures. In developing this approach, the ICRP sought to:

1. Base the limits on the total risk to all tissues as well as the hereditary detriment in the immediate offspring (first two generations);
2. Consider, in the case of internally deposited radionuclides, not only the dose occurring during the year of exposure, but also the committed dose for future years.

Having stated this objective, the next goal of the ICRP was to set the R occupational dose limits at such a level that the risks to the average worker incurred as a result of his/her radiation exposure would not exceed the risk of accidental death to an average worker in a "safe" non-nuclear industry. 

Based on a review of data on a world-wide basis (see Table I), the ICRP concluded that, on the average, within a "safe" industry about 100 workers or less would be killed accidentally each year for one million workers employed. Thus, the associated risk of accidental death to the average worker in a "safe" industry would be about: 100/year/1,000,000 = 1E-4/year.

B.  Risks of Death from Radiation Exposures:

Based on epidemiological studies with human populations and biological studies in animals, estimates can be made of the risk of a fatality from cancer or a genetic death for given levels of dose equivalent to various body organs. Some examples are given below to illustrate the thinking that goes into formulation of risk factors:

1. Studies of the survivors of the atomic bombings in Japan at the close of World War II indicate that for a collective dose of 10,000 person-Sv (1,000,000 person-rem) to the bone marrow, there will be, after latency period, an average of one excess case of leukemia occurring in the population each year. Assuming that each such case ultimately results in a death, and that the excess continues for a period of 20 years, there will be a total of 20 excess cases of leukemia and, therefore, 20 excess deaths due to this exposure. Thus, the risk of death due to leukemia resulting from exposure of the bone marrow can be estimated to be: 20 excess person deaths/10,000 person-Sv = 2E-3/Sv
2. Similar studies among uranium miners have shown that there will be approximately 20 excess cases of lung cancer (and consequently 20 excess deaths, assuming all cases of lung cancer are fatal) for each 10,000 person-Sv (1,000,000 person-rem) to the lungs. Thus the risk of death from lung cancer can be estimated to be: 20 excess deaths/10,000 lung-Sv = 2E-3/Sv
3. For breast cancer, epidemiological data have shown that there is an excess of about 100 breast cancers per 10,000 person-Sv (1,000,000 person-rem) to the female breasts. Assuming that breast cancer is fatal 50% of the time; and assuming that the population being exposed consists of 50% men and 50% women, then the risk of excess deaths due to exposure to the female breasts can be estimated to be: 100 excess cancers/10,000 breast-Sv x (0.5 fatality rate) x (0.5 of population being female)= 2.5E-3 / Sv
4. For thyroid cancer, epidemiological data have shown that there is an excess of about 100 thyroid cancers per 10,000 Sv (1,000,000 rem) to the thyroids in humans. However, the fatality rate for thyroid cancer is only about 5%, so the risk of death due to cancer of the thyroid resulting from exposure to ionizing radiation is: 100 excess cancers/10,000 thyroid-Sv x (0.05 fatality rate)=5E-4/Sv

Similar calculations can be made to estimate the excess deaths due to exposures of other body organs, as well as genetic deaths due to exposure of the reproductive organs.

Table 1 - Fatalities from Accidents in Different Occupations

Personnel Monitoring

1. Whole Body Badge (Film or TLD)

   1. Measures radiation dose equivalent to individual

   2. IS NOT a protective device.

2. Finger Ring (TLD)

   1. Measures radiation dose equivalent to hand.

   2. IS NOT a protective device

Radiation Level Surveys

1. Thin Window GM Survey Meter

   1. Detection of leakage radiation.

   2. Positive indication of the production of x-rays.

   3. Useful in monitoring routine operations.

   4. ALWAYS USE THIN WINDOW for low energy x-rays.

2. Annual Environmental Health and Safety Radiation Protection Survey

   1. Check for leakage radiation

   2. Check for compliance with campus and State regulations.

   3. Check personnel lists.

Machine Inspection Parameters

University of California, Davis 
Office of Environmental Health and Safety 
ANALYTICAL X-RAY SYSTEM AUDITS    

POSTING

Comments:____________________________________________________________

PERSONNEL

Comments:______________________________________________________________

TRAINING

Comments:_______________________________________________________________

MACHINE INFORMATION

Comments:________________________________________________________________

CONTROLS

Comments:________________________________________________________________

X-RAY SURVEY

Sketch the X-ray system on the back side and record survey results. 

DIFFRACTION OR FLUORESCENCE X-RAY MACHINE

Comments:_________________________________________________________________

MISCELLANEOUS

Comments:_________________________________________________________________

Audit Performed By:__________________________________ Date:__________________ 

   ADDITIONAL AUDIT ISSUES FOR DIFFRACTION OR FLUORESCENCE X-RAY UNITS

1. Principal Investigator (PI) Training of Authorized Users

   1. Inspect the PI's training program (outline/content)

   2. When and how is the power supply turned off?

2. Dosimetry

   1. What is the MUA policy for wearing dosimetry?

3. Safety Interlocks

   1. What is the MUA policy for entering the interlocked area?

   2. When the interlock circuit integrity is broken, does the power supply turned off?

   3. List all the warning indicators and their purpose.

4. Operating/Emergency Procedures

   1. Summarize the MUA operating procedure.

   2. Summarize the MUA emergency procedure. (Is it the EH&S Safety Protocol?)

5. Sample Changing Procedures

   1. Describe the authorization's procedure for changing samples.

   2. Is it a written procedure?

   3. Is a sample change recorded in the usage log?

   4. When and how is the power supply turned off?

6. Maintenance, Modification and Disassembly

   1. Describe the MUA procedure for any maintenance, modification or disassembly.

   2. Who is authorized to modify the machine?

   3. How often is the camera realigned?

   4. How often is the X-ray beam realigned?

   5. Describe the procedure for a realignment.

7. Survey Meter

   1. When is the survey meter used?

8. Security

   1. How is the machine secured from unauthorized use?

   2. Who controls the security key to the room/machine?

   3. What is the procedure for obtaining and/or using the security key?

Who has access to the room/machine?

1. Safety Interlock Override Key Control

   1. Is the machine provided with a safety interlock override key?

   2. What is the procedure for obtaining and/or using the key?

   3. Who has access to the key?

   4. Does the principal investigator oversee the key?

      If not, who is the key custodian and what qualifies them as custodian?

   5. How is security of the key maintained?

   6. Appropriate radiation safety officer signature approving key custodian. ______________

• Comments___________________________________________________________________
• MUA:____________
• Auditor:__________________________________________
• Date:________________________

Cabinet General Safety Protocol